We consider the problem of designing scalable and robust information systems based on multiple servers that can survive even massive denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. More precisely, we are focusing on designing a scalable distributed hash table (DHT) that is robust against so-called past insider attacks. In a past insider attack, an adversary knows everything about the system up to some time point t0 not known to the system. After t0, the adversary can attack the system with a massive DoS attack in which it can block a constant fraction of the servers of its choice. Yet, the system should be able to survive such an attack in a sense that for any set of lookup requests, one per non-blocked (i.e., non-DoS attacked) server, every lookup request to a data item that was last updated after t0 can be served by the system, and processing all the requests just needs polylogarithmic time and work at every server. We show that such a system can be designed.
INTRODUCTION
On Feb 6 of this year, hackers launched a distributed denial-ofservice (DoS) attack on the root servers of the Domain Name System (DNS) [1] . DoS attacks can overwhelm servers with hackergenerated traffic and make them unavailable for legitimate communications. While the attacks significantly slowed the operations of some of the servers, they caused no problems for the overall DNS system because the system shifts work to other root servers if it has trouble with the first ones it tries to reach. This is possible because information is replicated among all root servers, and the root servers together have sufficient bandwidth to handle even major DoS attacks.
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In this paper, we consider the problem of designing distributed information systems that are highly resilient against DoS attacks even if every piece of information is not replicated everywhere but only among a small subset of the servers. For distributed information systems that are connected to the Internet, like the DNS system, the servers may be known and therefore open for DoS attacks. There are various forms of DoS attacks. Application-layer DoS attacks, that try to abuse the protocols of the system in order to prevent it from functioning correctly, or network-layer DoS attacks that just aim at overloading servers with junk or faked messages in order to prevent them from processing legal ones. We are interested in designing a scalable information system that can withstand even massive application-layer and network-layer DoS attacks (i.e., the attacker is powerful enough to generate requests or junk that can affect a constant fraction of the servers). Certainly, if the attacker has complete knowledge of the information system, then scalability and robustness against massive DoS attacks cannot be achieved at the same time. But what if the attacker only has complete knowledge up to some time step t0 (that may not be known to the system)? Would it at least be possible to protect anything that was inserted into the system or updated after time step t0? To answer this question, let us first formally define the attack model we will be focusing on in this paper.
The past insider attack model
The past insider attack model is motivated by the fact that a large percentage of the security breaches in corporate systems have internal reasons, many of them being caused by human error or negligence or insider attacks. In these cases, the system may be temporarily exposed, with potentially severe consequences for its functionality.
In the past insider attack model, we assume that an attacker has complete knowledge of the system up to some time step t0 that is not known to the system. It can use this knowledge to attack the system at any time point after t 0 . Given n servers, we allow the attacker to generate any collection of lookup requests it likes, one per non-blocked server, including lookup requests to blocked or non-existing data, and to block any set of n servers for some sufficiently small constant 0 < < 1. The goal is to design a storage strategy for the data and a lookup protocol so that the following conditions are met. For every data item d, the total space for storing d in the system is by at most a polylogarithmic factor larger than the size of d, and for any set of lookup requests with at most one request per non-blocked server, the following holds:
• Scalability: Every server in the system spends at most a polylogarithmic amount of work and time on the requests.
• Robustness: Every lookup request to a data item inserted after t0 (or a non-existing data item) is served correctly.
• Searchability: Every lookup request to a data item inserted before t 0 is served correctly whenever the system is not under network-layer DoS attack.
By "served correctly" we mean that the latest version of the data item is returned to the server requesting it. (We assume that there is a unique way of identifying the latest version such as the version number or a time stamp.) Note that our model is different from proactive security models in which the adversary can never learn too much about the system within a certain time frame. Approaches for this model aim at protecting everything in the system, but this comes at a high price because this means that all the information in the system has to be continuously refreshed, which may not be feasible in practice. We can show that one can protect nearly everything without continuous refreshing, and most importantly, everything that was updated after the security breach.
Towards robustness to past insider attacks
Let us have a quick look at the basic approaches for storing data in a distributed system.
• An explicit data structure such as a distributed search tree or skip graph: This approach has major problems with searchability since it is difficult to update the structure at attacked parts.
• An implicit data structure like a hash table: The hash table is structureless and therefore has no problems with searchability. It is also scalable, but it is not robust because the adversary knows exactly where the copies of a data item are located and can therefore block these.
• The random placement of data copies among the servers: This is not scalable but certainly robust.
Is there a way of combining these approaches in order to achieve scalability, robustness and searchability at the same time? Our main contribution in this paper is to show that a certain hybrid version of a hash table and random placement can achieve this task. More precisely, we can prove the following result.
THEOREM 1.1. Given n servers, our storage strategy just needs O(log 2 n) copies per data item so that our lookup protocol can serve any set of lookup requests, one per non-blocked server, in a scalable, robust and consistent way, w.h.p. The robustness holds for any DoS attack in which at most n servers are blocked, where > 0 is a sufficiently small constant.
In the proof of the theorem, we assume that the servers are completely interconnected since we are only focusing on reliable servers, so there are no scalability problems w.r.t. connectivity.
Although we consider only problems where all lookup requests are given at the beginning, we note that our lookup protocol can also be applied in a scenario where continuously new requests are generated. Furthermore, the searchability condition can be strengthened in a sense that beyond O(n + D/n k ) data items, where D is the total number of data items in the system and k can be an arbitrary constant, all of the data inserted before t 0 can still be accessed by our lookup protocol under a DoS attack, but it can obviously not be guaranteed that everything is still accessible. Using coding strategies (like Reed-Solomon codes), the storage overhead for the data items can be reduced to O(log n) in Theorem 1.1. The constant that we need in our proofs is < 1/144, but we did not try to optimize constants in this paper.
We remark that we do not address the problem of handling insert requests but only how to store data in the system in a scalable way so that it can be retrieved despite massive DoS attacks. Managing insert requests is a tricky issue when application-and network-layer DoS attacks are allowed since the attacker can substantially harm the execution of insert requests generated by itself via network-layer DoS attacks, and we do not know a solution for that yet. Taking this restriction into account, our strategies would work best for archival systems or systems for information retrieval like Google, CiteSeer or Akamai.
Sketch of the construction
Our construction uses c = Θ (log m) hash functions, denoted  by h 1 , . . . , h c , that map data names to points in the [0, 1) interval, where m represents the size of the universe of all data names. The hash functions have to satisfy certain expansion properties (which are met by random hash functions, with high probability). For any point x ∈ [0, 1), let D i (x) be the set of points of distance i from x, i.e., the set of points y so that x results from y by removing the k most significant bits in the binary encoding of y (i.e., the encoding (y1, y2, ...) so that y = i yi/2 i ). For each new (or update of a) data item d and each distance i ∈ {0, . . . , log n},
by picking a random subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , c} of size Θ(log n) and a random point in each Di(hj(d)) with j ∈ S. So altogether, d has Θ(log 2 n) copies. The n servers partition [0, 1) into n intervals of equal size, and each server is responsible for storing the copies placed into points in its interval.
Next we explain how to process the lookup requests. Suppose that each non-blocked server has one lookup request (that may be adversarially chosen). The servers process the lookup requests in two stages, called contraction stage and expansion stage.
In the contraction stage, each server with a lookup request for d selects O((log m)(log n)) routes Ri,j with i ∈ {1, . . . , c} and j = O(log n). Each route Ri,j chooses a random point x log n ∈ D log n (h i (d)) and the remaining points x log n−1 , . . . , x 0 so that x i results from x log n by removing the log n − i most significant bits in x log n . The points in the routes R i,j are processed distance by distance, starting with distance log n. At each distance, the number of blocked and congested servers owning the corresponding points in the R i,j 's is recorded, and the distance is decreased for d until one of the numbers exceeds a certain threshold.
In the expansion stage, the servers search for copies of requested data items distance by distance, where a server with a request that stopped at distance k in the contraction stage will become active at distance k+1 in the expansion stage. For each server with a request for item d that is active for a specific distance k, all servers owning points in ∪ c j=1 D k (hj(d)) are contacted (which are 2 k many) via a random distributed broadcast mechanism. If sufficiently many copies of a data item are collected, the search stops, and otherwise it continues for the next larger distance.
In the scheme, some data items inserted after t 0 may take a large effort to locate sufficiently many copies for them, but, crucially, it can be shown that the set of data items requiring a large effort is small so that overall every server only has to spend a polylogarithmic amount of work on all requests. For details of the construction and related work we refer to [2] .
